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Mark Green and Beverly Moore, Jr.*
We are gratified that a critic like Mr. Winter, who has labored
under the misimpression that we were advocates of more regulation,
now understands and agrees with our previously articulated view1
about the monopoly-making tendencies of past and present economic
regulation. His reply, however, passes beyond agreement with what was
said to disparagement of what was not. The designated topic of eco-
nomic regulation and restrictions precluded extensive discussion of
health and safety regulation. But since Mr. Winter now focuses on
health and safety regulation, we turn to that topic.
I
Mr. Winter's critique, as befits his orientation, is that of the law
professor before a first year class: asking questions, not answering
them; deploying theories, not facts. Instead of health and safety regu-
lation, he doggedly opts for a free market solution to consumer prob-
lems. Despite his many theoretic contentions-the key one being that
consumer sovereignty is alive and well-Mr. Winter offers hardly any
supporting studies or data. Let us take two examples. For all his hy-
pothesizing about the potentially damaging effects of health and safety
regulation, one of the few studies he cites is Peltzman's The Benefits
and Costs of New Drug Regulation.2 That study purports to demon-
strate that the FDA requirement that new drugs be proven safe before
being allowed on the market, in Mr. Winter's words, "significantly
impedes the rate of introduction of new drugs and thus prevents bene-
ficial as well as harmful drugs from entering the market."3 It has been
thoroughly discredited by medical authorities, who concur that while'
the FDA has blocked some dangerous drugs, it has not thwarted any
. B.A. University of North Carolina, 1967; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1970. Due to
Nader's previously scheduled commitments during the time available for a rebuttal,
the Journal invited Mr. Moore to join Mr. Mark Green in the following response to
Mr. Winter.
1. See R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMIssioN (1970): M. GREE', B. MooRE
& B. WASSERSTEIN, 2 THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSrsr '(Prelim. ed. 1971).
2. S. PELTZI7MAN, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF NEW DRUG REGULATION (1972).
3. Winter, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Ralph Nader and Creeping Capital.
ism, 82 YALE L.J. 891 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Winteri.
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safe and substantial ones.4 Still, due to necessitous proponents like
Mr. Winter, Peltzman's study retains signs of life.
Second, Mr. Winter argues that consumers "may" be better off with
industrial concentration, rather than with more structural competition,
due to large scale economies.0 Almost anything "may" be true, but
what is the weight of the evidence? A large body of empirical data
relates industrial concentration to monopoly profits,0 excessive execu-
tive compensation, internal inefficiency, 8 technological sloth,9 and
4. Peltzman shows that the number of "new chemical entities" in drugs declined front
43.5 per year during the pre-regulation 1956-1962 period to 16.2 per year during the 1963-
1970 period; he attributes the decline to the effects of mandatory pre-market safety clear-
ance. S. PELTZMAN, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF NEW DRUG REGULATION (1972). The
number of "new chemical entities" introduced, however, bears no relation to significant
advances in medicine. Any slight molecular modification of an existing compound quall.
fies as a "new chemical entity." Actually, the number of significant therapeutic advances
in new drugs has been about the same during the period of regulation as before. 1-.
DOWLING, MEDICINES FOR MAN 99 (1970) places the number of important therapeutic ad.
vances at three to four per year for both the regulation and pre-regulation periods. The
analysis of Dr. Henry E. Simmons, Director of the F.D.A.'s Bureau of Drugs, indicates
that the average yearly number of important therapeutic advances was 6.86 during the
1950-1963 pre-regulation period and 5.7 during the 1964-1971 period. Hearings on Com.
petitive Problems in the Drug Industry before the Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate
Select Committee on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 5, 1973). The "new chemical
entities" statistic on which Peltzman relies thus reflects drug firms' successes In differen-
tiating their products and in carving out new patent monopolies, not in reducing the
toll of illness.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Peltzman's thesis were correct, the appropriate remedy
would not be to drop the testing requirement, but rather to permit the marketing of
promising drugs, with effective warnings, pending the completion of their tests, provided
that the producers be made liable for any injuries to consumers in the interim. In fact,
this is the procedure that the FDA often follows, id., except that no provision for ulti-
mate tort liability is provided. In addition, FDA safety guidelines do not require that
new drugs be free of all harmful side-effects. Injuries to small percentages of tle user
population from drugs deemed by the agency to be "safe" are often explicitly recognized.
To abolish the requirement that drugs be proven safe would surely increase the risk of
numerous thalidomide-type disasters. Even now, an estimated three to five percent of all
admissions to medical services and as many as 30,000 hospital patient deaths annually
result primarily from adverse drug reactions. Hurwitz, Admissions to Hospital Due to
Drugs, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 539 (1969); Seidl, et al., Studies on the Epidemiology of Adverse
Drug Reactions III: Reactions in Patients on a General Medical Service, 119 BULL. JOHNS
HOPKINS Hose. 299 (1966); unpublished data supplied by Dr. Milton Silverman and Dr.
Philip R. Lee, University of California at San Francisco. The need for more effective
drug regulation rather than abandonment of present efforts is underscored by the 1.5
million cases annually of adverse reactions to FDA approved drugs, Cluff, Problems
with Drugs, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONTINUING EDUCATION FOR PHIYSICIANS
IN THE 'USE OF DRUCS 9 (Nat'l Academy of Sciences, 1969), seventy to eighty percent of
which are preventable. Melmon, Preventable Drug Reactions-Causes and Cures, 284 NEw
ENGLAND MED. J. 1361 (1971).
5. See Winter 892.
6. See generally Weiss, Quantitative Studies in Industrial Organization in FRONTIERS
OF QUANTITATIV'E ECONOMICS 363-71 (M. Intriligator ed. 1972).
7. See, e.g., Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. EcoN.
REV. 1032, 1042-47 (1963).
8. See, e.g., id. at 1051-53; Liebenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. 'X.Efficiency,' 56 AM.
ECON. REV. 392 (1966); IV. SHEPHERD, MARKET POWER AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 195-96 (1970),
Cf. Alchian & Kessel, Competition, Monopoly, and the Pursuit of Money, in NAr'L
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, ASPECTS OF LABOR ECONOMICS (1962). Within three
months after workers in the Kaiser Steel Company's Fontana, California plant were told
of an impending shutdown due to competition from Japanese imports, productivity rose
by 32.1 percent. Washington Post, Feb. 11, 1973, § E, at 5, col. 1.
9. See generally J. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONcENTRATION 199-254 (1972).
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employment discrimination.10 Conceding that the power of a pure
monopolist to price above marginal cost will result in output restric-
tion and resource misallocation, Mr. Winter nevertheless concludes
that "until one knows what efficiency gains-reduction of marginal cost
-are produced through economies of scale, the factual conclusion that
consumers suffer from concentration cannot be made."'" Yet the avail-
able data indicate that the large majority of leading firms in concen-
trated industries are far larger than would be necessary to exploit any
economies of scale.12 This is a crucial point, for the original article
was careful to recommend that economic deconcentration precede eco-
nomic deregulation where necessary to make the market viably com-
petitive.
3
10. Shepherd, Market Power and Racial Discrimination in White-Collar Employment,
14 ANrrmusT BULL. 141 (1969).
11. Winter 899.
12. See, e.g., J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW ComspErrrto 111 (1956); Saving, Estimation
of Optimum Size of Plant by the Survivor Technique, 75 Q.J. EcoN'. 569 (1961); Sherman
& Tollison, Public Policy Toward Oligopoly: Dissolution and Scale Economies, 4 ANTM-
TRUSr L. & EcoN. REv. 77 (1971); Esposito, Noel & Esposito, Dissolution and Scale
Economies: Additional Estimates and Analysis, 5 ANrrrausr L. & EcoN.. Rn'. 103 (1971).
See also Kottke, Dissolution and Scale Economies: A Comment, 5 Ahmnrrtusr L. & EcoN.
REv. 55 (1972). Even in the few industries where deconcentration might impose higher
costs through suboptimal scale economies, the countervailing gains from improved re-
source allocation, increased internal efficiency and technological progressivity, and re-
distribution of monopoly profits and excessive compensation must be considered before
rejecting divestiture on economic efficiency grounds.
Mr. Winter errs in three other respects in describing our antitrust views. "A consistent,
principled, assault on concentration," he states, "would thus involve a frontal attack on
vast areas of the economy and not just on certain highly visible, and politically vulner-
able, industries." Winter 898-99. Never have we advocated deconcentration only for "highly
visible" or "politically vulnerable" industries. Except for a minimum industry size re-
quirement dictated by the consideration of administrative feasibility--we have suggested
annual sales of $50 million-we have urged deconcentration of all concentrated industries.
M. GR.EEN, B. MOORE & B. WVAssERsTEiN, THE CLOSED EirrERP1SE SvSTM 308-13 (1972).
Given that one must begin somewhere, and with limited resources, a deconcentration
campaign should proceed first against those industries which involve the largest markets
and the highest degrees of concentration.
It is also said that our deconcentration proposals would require "the courts to de-
termine the optimal size or number of firms in an industry." Winter 899. On the con-
trary, our objective of reducing four-firm concentration ratios to below fifty percent
and eight-firm concentration ratios to below seventy percent leaves wide latitude for
the number and size of the firms operating within those parameters.
In addition, it is asserted that "[s]o long as government does not restrict entry, any
concentration not based on efficiency will ultimately be destroyed by market forces.'
Id. But how long should injured consumers be required to wait? Imperfections in the
market insulate concentrated industries from competitive entry. Such imperfections in-
clude entry barriers associated with product differentiation (see Comanor & Wilson.
Advertising, Market Structure, and Performance, 49 Rxv. Eco.. & STAT. 423 (1967)), and
excess capacity (see Wenders, Excess Capacity as a Barrier to Entry, 20 J. IND. ECoN. 14
(1971)), and imperfections in the capital market exacerbated by the size of vertically inte-
grated firms (see Hall & "Weiss, Firm Size and Profitability, 49 Rn'. Eco.;. & STAT. 319
(1967)). Mr. Winter's basic contention is belied by the persistence of high levels of con-
centration in particular industries (see REP.RT OF THE WIVlTE HOUSE TASK Foac ON
ANrrmusr POLICY 6 (1968)) and the overall economy (see IV. Shepherd, supra note 7, at
106) coupled with the general absence of justifying economies of scale.
13. Green & Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly
Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nader].
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II
Perhaps the best example of the empirical weakness of Mr. Winter's
argument concerns consumer information and consumer sovereignty.
He contends that our proposals for increased business disclosures, en-
abling consumers to compare product values and to purchase more
intelligently, merely reflect our personal preferences, "imposing on
consumers the cost of collecting and transmitting information which
they find has little value.' '1 4 He provides no examples of such useless
information; nor, apparently, does he feel them necessary, for he
writes: "[c]ompetition rewards those who provide the information de-
sired by consumers."' 5 Any information not generated by competitive
forces is characterized as a costly and useless surplus (absent some spe-
cial showing of free rider effects or, in the case of cigarettes, addic-
tion). 6 In Mr. Winter's view there can be no market failure to provide
optimal consumer information. Advertising and other seller promo-
tional materials do the job nicely.
To assess this thesis, we analyzed the content of approximately 1,000
network television food commercials. These typically provided con-
sumers with such valuable tips as:
"Mm good!"
"The secret sauce kids never get tired of"
"No dog food ever looked like that before"
"Lip smacking, whip cracking, patty whacking"
"It's the real thing"
"Anyone can be a Frito bandito"
In general, the foods with the least nutritional value were the most
heavily advertised.Y Yet the nutrition "information" contained in
such ads often consisted of such vague assertions as "nutritious," "fully
balanced," "nourishing," "loaded with energy," or "fortified with
body-building vitamins and iron." Information was never provided
about the disadvantages or weaknesses of the advertised products.
Numerous claims were made that the advertised product was "better"
or "different" or "unique" in some manner, but rarely were compet-
14. See Winter 890.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. This is in part true because snacks, candies, and highly processed convenience
items are more easily differentiated than more nutritious traditional staples. Thus, I
a story rejoicing over the gains of soft drinks at the expense of competing beverages, the
1971-1972 SoFr DRINK ANNUAL MANUAL bluntly attributed much of the decline in per
capita milk consumption "to the fact that the milk industry simply does not promote
its products in an aggressive manner." Id. at 63.
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ing products faulted for their shortcomings, and never were they iden-
tified by name.' 8
The theoretical justification for such advertising and promotional
expenditures is, surely, to supply information that supports consumer
sovereignty. Instead, producer sovereignty is the actual objective and
result. Advertising does not function in an adversary manner. It pre-
sents the pros, not the cons.' 9 It fosters no true marketplace of ideas.
That consumers may accept the advertised products does not' mean
that they would not prefer other products-alternatives presently avail-
able in the market, about which the competitive process does not gen-
erate optimal information, and alternatives only potentially available
abotit which there is no information. And why should it be othenvise?
Producers, operating in a world in which consumers have less product
information than they, can opt for the easier and less risky path of sell-
ing what consumers will accept rather than what they would prefer.
To assume that the market generates all the cost-effective information
that consumers need to maximize the value of their purchasing power
is to mistake a fanciful model for the real world.20
18. In fact, until 1972, television networks refused to broadcast commercials which
criticized competing products by name. In that year, the) were persuaded by the FTC
to change their policy. Subsequently, advertisements for only a handful of products have
specifically referred to competing brands.
19. See Washington Post, Jan. 31, 1973, § B, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1973,
§ F, at 15, col. 1. Cf. Scitovsky, Ignorance as a Source of Oligopoly Power, 40 AM. EcoN.
REV. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 48 (1950).
20. Since it is convenient for economists to assume perfect knowledge, little attention
has been paid to the subject of consumer utility maximization. If consumers were ade-
quately informed by the forces of competition, we would expect that the higher the
price, the higher the quality; the lower the price, the lower the quality. The correlation,
however, between the Consumers Union product quality ratings and the prices of the
rated products is only approximately .35. Oxenfeldt, Consumer Knowledgqe: Its Meas-.
urement and Extent, 32 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 300 (1950); Morris & Bronson, The Chaos of
Competition Indicated by Consumers Reports, 33 J. MAM EarNG 26 (1969). When the sample
is limited to product classes offering eight or more brand altematives with interbrand
price spreads of at least fifty percent the median price.quality correlation plummets to
.20. Friedman, Quality and Price Considerations in Rational Consumer Decision.Mahing,
1 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 13, 17 (1966). There are many examples of this phenomenon.
Nationally advertised supermarket items sell for about twenty percent more than store
brands even though both products are virtually identical and often manufactured by the
same company. Nat'l Comm'n on Food Marketing, Special Studies in Food Marketing
47, 65 Tech. Study No. 10 (1966). In another study, there was a 170 percent spread be-
tween the lowest and highest priced life insurance policies of comparable value. with
many of the largest and best known companies' policies being the most expensive. PE,..
INsURANcE Comaix'N, SHoPPERS GUIDE tO LIFE INSURFANCE 14, 15 (1972). Pennsylvania In-
surance Commissioner Herbert S. Dennenberg estimates that informed consumers could
save $3 billion annually in premiums if they shopped for and actually purchased the
best buys. Washington Post, May 25, 1972, at xx, col. B1.
In his analysis, supra, of thirty consumer product classes, Alfred R. Oxenfeldt assumed,
as the unavailability of data forced him to assume, that the product sample was random,
that brand sales were equal, and that Consumers Union product quality ratings mir-
rored actual consumer evaluations. He then projected that consumers purchasing the
"best buy" brands could have increased the value of their purchasing power by fully
fifty percent.
No doubt the market does generate some useful consumer information, but it also
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Still, Mr. Winter insists that "consumer choice" is the "plausible
explanation" for such phenomena as the presence of ornamental bump-
ers and the superior profitability of white bread compared to more
nutritious varieties..2 1 But were consumers ever given the choice be-
tween a functional bumper able to withstand a five-mile-per-hour col-
lision without damage at an extra cost of $100 (to use the auto indus-
try's dubiously high estimate),22 and an ornamental bumper with a
$332 repair bill for each such collision?2 3 Since auto firms promoted
and offered only the latter, it is circular to argue that consumers
"chose" it over the former. Similarly, Mr. Winter offers no evidence
that consumers who "choose" white bread over whole wheat bread are
consciously aware that the milling process depletes white bread of
15.9-86.3 percent of 20 essential vitamins and minerals, with most
losses in the higher range, while "enrichment" partially replaces only
four of these nutrients. 24 Indeed, the available evidence contradicts
his contention.25
If sellers fail to provide optimum consumer information, Mr. Win-
ter assumes that entrepreneurs will "establish independent testing or-
ganizations where the value of information to consumers is greater
than the cost of collection and transmittal." 20 But practical difficulties,
such as manufacturers' resistance to disclosure, argue against reliance
produces much puffery and deception. A large proportion of advertising claims cannot
be substantiated by sellers. Cf., e.g., STAFF OF SENATE COMMERCE COMMITrEE, 92t CONG,
2D SESS., REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N ON THE AD SUBSTANTIATION I'ROGRAM
(Comm. Print. 1972). On balance, the evidence supports a presumption, contrary to that
asserted by Mr. Winter, that the market functions to minimize consumer sovereignty
relative to independent, non-seller sources of consumer information.
21. Winter 896.
22. Hearings on Automobile Insurance Reform and Cost Savings Before the Senate
Commerce Committee, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1225 (1971). In contrast to Ford's
S100 cost estimate, Paul and Douglas Taylor, a father and son engineering team, demon.strated a bumper resistant to damage at five mph that they were willing to sell to auto
companies at $25. Id. at 1421-22.
23. This was the average repair bill for the 1971 Chevrolet Impala, Ford Galaxie,
Plymouth Fury I, and AMC Ambassador, test crashed into a stationary barrier by the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. Contrary to Mr. Winter's implication, Depart.
ment of Transportation studies demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of bumper standards.
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADM., AN ECONOMIC ANALYSISOF TIlE EXTERIOR PRO.
TECTION STANDARDS, FMVSS-215 (1971). In fact, the statute requires that government bunt.
per standards be cost effective. 15 U.S.A. § 1912(b)(1) (Supp. 1973).
24. Schroeder, Losses of Vitamins and Trace Minerals Resulting from Processing
and Preservation of Foods, 24 AM. J. CLIN. NUTRITION 562, 567, 569 (1971).
25. Experiments with nutritional labeling programs indicate that consumers do se-
lect more nutritious foods when supplied with the necessary nutrient composition In-
formation. Stokes, The Consumer Research Institute's Nutrient Labeling Research Pro-
gram, 27 Foon DRUG CosMErIC L.J. 249 (1972); Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare,
Nutrition Labeling, 37 Fed. Reg. 6493 (1972). With respect to the specific case posed by
Mr. Winter, the Washington, D.C., area Giant food chain's sales of whole wheat bread
increased from 400 to 1700 loaves per day after its institution of an experimental nu-
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on this assumption. More importantly, information contained in a pub-
lication like Consumer Reports is denied access to the most efficient
channels of communication available to sellers, through advertising,
packaging, and point of purchase. Consumers Union would be un-
able to compel payment from consumers benefiting from data dissemi-
nated in this manner.2 7 Consequently, we propose that independent
information be funnelled to consumers through these efficient chan-
nels. We advocate free counter-advertising from a diversity of non-
governmental groups, grading of products' performance characteristics
and rating of the quality of consumer services (not unlike the govern-
ment's defining of weights and measures, which Mr. Winter ap-
proves).28 We would also provide labeling which forces clear and effec-
tive disclosure of such information as nutrient content, ingredient per-
centages, price per unit, predicted average useful life and repair, safety
hazards, and warranty terms. "Consumer sovereignty" might then be
more reality than homily.
III
The issue is perhaps best joined in the category of safety regulation.
Mr. Winter says that we "fail to justify safety regulation on grounds
of true market failure."29 This is clearly incorrect, as the article spe-
cifically says that "[s]afety regulation explicitly assumes that the market
will not adequately protect consumers against certain product haz-
ards." 30 Just as economic regulation is justified by market incapacity
(natural monopoly), so safety regulation is necessary when the market-
place fails to encourage the manufacture of optimally safe products.
This may occur under various conditions including the following:
(1) when the users do not fully control purchases (e.g., the doctor, not
27. One disadvantage faced by an organization such as Consumers Union is corporate
credibility resulting from image building via institutional advertising. e.g., "Trust
Texaco," and from deliberate attempts to exploit consumers' gullibility and to direct
consumer attention away from the most relevant product characteristics. For example,
the All-American image projected by food manufacturers' marketing surve)s unani-
mously indicate that most housewives believe family diets to be nutritionally adequate.
Bauman, Problems of Researching and Marketing Fortified Foods and Its Implications
on Consumption Trends, COUNCIL ON FOODS AND NuTmox, A.%tERicAN Mr. Ass'N, SYm-
POSIUM ON VITAM ,INS AND MINERALS IN PROCESSED FOODS 236 (1971), even though other
surveys demonstrate that there are substantial nutritional deficiencies among all seg-
ments of the population, UNrrIT STATES DEP'T OF HEALTi, EDUCAmTION AND WELFARE, Tun
STATE NUTRITION SURVEY 1968-1970 (1972); UNrrr STATES DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, Di TrAr
LEVELS OF HOUSFHOLS IN THE UNITED STATES, SPRING, 1965, at 6, 9 (1969); Davis, Gershoff
& Gamble, Review of Studies of Vitamin and Mineral Nutrition in the United States
(1957-1958), 1 J. NUTRITION ED. 41 (Supp. 1, 1969).
28. See Winter 900.
29. Id. at 896.
50. Nader 885.
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the patient-consumer, decides what drugs will be taken); (2) when the
producer has little incentive to produce a safe product because con-
sumers cannot judge safety factors (the average consumer cannot deter-
mine how much DES is in his meat, or how much radiation is being
emitted from his medical x-ray); and (3) when manufacturers have an
interest in producing unsafe or easily damageable products (auto firms
have a lucrative parts market). The original article says that safety
regulation is warranted under such conditions because "it is better to
prevent consumer harm than compensate it later."3' Winter would
insist on an additional condition: thit "compensation is in fact inade-
quate in the case of the particular product."3 2 This condition almost
always prevails: the tort victim's ability to collect is persistently under-
mined by the difficulty of calculating damages, imperfect substantive
liability rules, restrictions on class actions, dilatory practices of de-
fendant corporations, "ethical" prohibitions against lawyers informing
consumers of their right to sue,33 similar rules against lawyers' finafnc-
ing and purchasin 34 consumer causes of action, and the general high
cost of legal representation. How often do the victims of food poison-
ing-an illness ranked second only to the common cold in frequency
by many experts35-recover damages from the responsible restaurant,
food processor, or other source? The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration has placed the societal cost of 1971 motor vehicle acci-
dents at $46 billion.36 Yet insurance payments to accident victims in
the same year totaled only $7.1 billion.37 A study commissioned by the
Department of Transportation found that permanent total disability
claimants received only sixteen percent compensation for their average
31. Nader 885.
32. Winter 895. He would also require, in simplified language, that the benefits of
regulation exceed its costs. Winter 892. While this is a perfectly reasonable and ob-
vious rule, Mr. Winter's hints that it is not presently followed in health and safety
regulation are unimpressive and without documentation. His reference to tie Peltzman
study is, as noted, completely without merit. See note 5 supra.
33. See Note, The Bar As Trade Association: Economics, Ethics, and the First Amend.
ment, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 334 (1970).
34. Cf. Schwartz, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee In Personal -Injury Lid.
gation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1154 (1970). Imperfections in the capital market have general.
y precluded the financing of consumer litigation by traditional lending organizations.
35. Fodor, et at., Food Poisoning Occurrences in New York City 1969, 85 PuB. HEALTit
REP. 1013 (1970).
36. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIc SAFETY ADI., SocIErAL Cosrs OF MOTOR VEIIICLE
ACCIDENTS, app. B, at 1 (1972).
37. Interview with Dean Sharp, Counsel to the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee in Washington, D.C., March 10, 1973. Mr.
Sharp's estimate is based on projections from Hearings on the Insurance Industry Before
The Antitrust and Monopoly Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 17, at 10188 (1969).
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economic losses.38 State workmen's compensation systems have pro-
duced similar results.39 No doubt reform could be instituted to render
tort compensation a more effective accident cost internalizer. But until
such reforms become reality, some regulatory proxy is necessary to
stimulate the cost-effective prevention technologies that producers
would adopt if accident costs were interialized.4°
Mr. Winter misunderstands our statement that "the harm inflicted
may simply be unacceptable to its victims," 41 calling it merely one of
our "preferences." 42 The original point was twofold. First, an assess-
ment of accident costs must recognize that accidents, especially fatal
ones, are not transactions into which the average consumer would will-
ingly enter, even if tort compensation ensured that full compensation
for the value of his life were paid for his heirs.43 And second, while
it is -logically possible that a regime of education through fatality (in
which, for example, consumers would learn, the hard way, which drugs
cause deformity) would make the FDA unnecessary, the toll in death
and disability due to adverse drug reactions is, simply, unacceptable.
To argue otherwise-there is no kinder way to put it-is intellectually
brutal. A more humane and cost-effective approach is to prevent this
consumer harm rather than either to compensate for it later or to tol-
erate it as the inevitable price of some macabre "free market" of con-
sumer sovereignty.
Compounding his confusion, Mr. Winter asserts that the unaccept-
ability of accidents to victims "is, save where externalities are pres-
ent, simply no theory at all." 44 But in this, Mr. Winter fails to realize
that accident costs are externalities. Externalities can be divided into
two classes. "Externalities external to the industry" are exemplified
by automobile air pollution and accidents involving pedestrians.
Social costs not reflected in automobile prices are imposed on per-
38. U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WtrOmOu.ILE ACIDE T
INJURIES (1970); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJUY CLAI SIS
(1970).
59. See THE REPORT OF THE N.TL COs suIssION ON STATE WoRKmEAS COMSPENS.TION
LAws (1972).
40. Mr. Winter's speculation that "[h]ad Mr. Nader been the force in the fifties that
he is today, it is likely that he would have made strange bedfellows with the American
auto industry in its battle against the small (and less safe) foreign car," Winter 896. has
already been proven wrong. Mr. Nader and foreign imports were around in the GW0, when
imports concerned Detroit far more than in the prior decade: Yet there is no evidence
that safety regulation was manipulated into an anticompetitive entry barrier.
41. Nader 885.
42. Winter 896.
43. Other scholars have recognized that additional compensation should be paid for
the involuntary nature of takings. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1214 (1967).
44. Winter 895 [emphasis added].
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sons not parties to the automobile purchase transaction. On the other
hand, "externalities internal to the industry" involve social costs
imposed by products upon their own consumers-e.g., the accident
victim whose mishap results from safety defects in his own automo-
bile, or the person whose nutritional deficiencies and attendant ad-
verse health consequences result from the food he eats. In theory, if
consumers had perfect knowledge of these risks, they would adjust
their purchases to a level of demand at a market price which included
the cost of insurance against such risks; there would then be no re-
source misallocation. 45 But again theory stumbles on practical fact:
Consumers have neither the omniscience nor the unlimited shopping
time so blithely assumed.
4 6
Even if consumers did possess perfect knowledge of product haz-
ards, so that resource misallocation would be avoided, it would never-
theless be reasonable to compel manufacturers to avoid externalities
internal to the industry. The objective here is to reduce the sum of
accident and costs that society must bear. Consumers already have a
strong personal stake in avoiding harm to themselves. Producers are
in the best position to reduce the costs of accidents through changes
in product design or effectively communicated use directions.4 7 The
burden of developing and introducing the most cost-effective accident
prevention measures technologically possible should therefore be im-
posed by law upon producers. Firms would be encouraged by the
profit motive to develop and adopt cost-effective accident preven-
tion technology in order to avoid the higher costs, higher prices, and
lower sales and profits that full internalization would cause.
Full internalization might increase the price of products to reflect
their accident costs, causing a decline in sales. But profits would not
suffer if the costs of accident prevention technology were less than the
45. E.g., E.J. MISHAN, Cosr-BENEM'T ANALYSIS 164-66 (1971).
46. Even Richard Posner, Mr. Winter's ideological ally, notes as a special case of mar-
ket failure to generate optimal consumer information, that a seller might avoid inform-
ing consumers that a competing product is less safe than his own for fear of implying
that his own product is at all unsafe. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. L EAL
STUDiEs 205, 211 (1973).
47. Posner argues for a negligence, rather than a strict liability, standard by which:
the cost of unavoidable accidents is borne by the victims of accidents. They can re-
duce this cost in the long run by financing research into and development of cost-
justified measures by which to protect themselves. The victims will not themselves
organize for research, but they will provide the market for firms specializing in the
development of new safety appliances.
Id. at 209. The flaw in this argument is that there will be an optimal demand for such
a new safety appliance market only if consumers first obtain perfect knowledge of safety
risks. For example, seat belts were offered by small independent companies for years
but Detroit refused to install them. There may be special cases in which consumers
rather than producers can avoid accidents at least cost, but the burden of proof should
be placed upon those arguing for such a result.
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increased price increment associated with internalization. For ex-
ample, although bumpers sustaining little damage at ten-miles-per-
hour crashes were once considered unduly costly, their development
suddenly became far more technologically feasible after firms were
compelled to build more crash-worthy bumpers. This point Mr.
Winter fails to appreciate. He wrongly assumes firms' continued tech-
nological indifference to safety innovations, following enforcement
of safety regulation.
48
Mr. Winter concedes that externalities external to the industry do
exist and that they would, at times, justify regulation.40 But once
again he backpeddles. He raises the specter of psychic harm resulting
from the mere thought of others watching obscene movies.5° The
specter is a sham: Prohibition or compensation would be invoked
only for by-products which are substantially and objectively exter-
nalities-those which are involuntarily consumed by third parties
and which cause cognizable property damage. Auto pollution is such
an externality. Obscenity upsetting old ladies is an extremely sub-
jective matter, and to label it an externality would make every per-
son a censor. Moreover, while freedom of speech is a constitutional
right, the freedom to pollute is not.
As he does elsewhere, Mr. Winter conjures up a variety of canards
in his attempt to demonstrate the irrationality of imposing anti-pol-
lution control devices on cars. As self-appointed spokesman for the
rural poor, he argues that they are unfairly taxed by regulation which
benefits others.'; He thus employs the well-worn tactic of invoking
a small "victim" to justify a larger victimization (not unlike the large
48. Since compulsory seat belt wearing raised by Mr. Winter is not mentioned in
the original article, a full discussion of it is inappropriate here. Air bags may soon moot
this incipient controversy, since they would avoid the civil liberties issue and would only
work at a time to prevent injury to auto users, a benefit few if any would reject. Briefly,
in our view, the compulsory wearing of seat belts would be justified because: a) based on
the Australian experience, some 11,500 American lives annually would be saved and car
drivers and passengers would grow accustomed to this minor (if that) inconvenience (cf.
Washington Post, March 21, 1972, § B, at 1, col. 4); b) when X doesn't wear his or her
seat belt, more than just X may be affected: if he is thrown onto the road in an accident
or otherwise incapacitated because he is not strapped in, the non.belted rider can cause
multiple wrecks by being unable to prevent further collisions; c) every auto death costs
200,700 in a variety of hospital, death, and retraining costs and lost-wages, Societal
Costs of Motor Vehicle Accidents, supra note 36, app. D, at 1; and d) if a majority of
the motoring public were fully informed of the major reduction in risk to their own
safety at such a small cost in inconvenience they would no doubt vote in a referendum
for compulsory seat belt wearing, foregoing the immediate gratification of not buckling up
in order to realize long-run safety benefits; to assume othenvise is to assume the publics
irrationality. Finally, one wonders about the hue and cry over this idea when the
FAA has for years required airline passengers to fasten seatbelts during takeoffs and
landings.
49. See Winter 898.
50. See id. at 897.
51. See id. at 897-98.
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corporate interests who oppose stiffer business controls because they
might hurt shareholding widows). Mr. Winter would deny relief to
millions of the poor locked in smogged cities because of some thou-
sands who supposedly do not similarly suffer.52 Large social and eco-
nomic savings would result from reduced motor vehicle emissions,
which cause at least $6 billion annually in damages according to an
estimate prepared for the Office of Science and Technology.a Strik-
ingly, Mr. Winter does not understand that while auto pollution con-
trol devices may impose short-run costs on car owners, they enable
net social savings due to decreased property and health damage. And
he ignores the basic goal of motor vehicle emissions regulations-to
develop a non-polluting alternative to the traditional internal combus-
tion engine.54 If manufacturers eventually adopt this alternative, con-
sumers will pay less for their cars and for repairs, and buy less gaso-
line, at lower prices (given reduced demand). All of this Mr. Winter
ignores, since he preoccupies himself with emission control costs, not
emission control savings.
Mr. Winter criticizes our inclusion of antitrust, employment dis-
crimination laws, occupational safety and health requirements and
unemployment compensation lawsi 5 in the category of enabling legis.
52. In fact, air and rivers polluted by an urban source spill out do affect vast areas,
as rural locales outside of Chicago and in Southern California are finding out. The
auto manufacturers, in any event, would hardly find it rewarding to produce two dif-
ferent cars for various models to service such a small sector as the rural poor. And a
two-car strategy is administratively unworkable anyway, given that nearly twenty per-
cent of the population moves every two years. Bureau of the Census, Current 1op.
Repts. Series P-20, No. 210, computed from Motor Vehicle Mantf. Ags'n 1972 Auto-
mobile Facts and Figures (1972). What would happen to people in West Virginia with
"rural" cars who want to travel into any surrounding state, all of which have "urban"
car regulation. People take motoring trips from one region to another and the average
car changes ownership every three years.
53. OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, CUMULATIVE REGULATORY EFFEcrS ON TIe
COST Or AUTOMOTIVE TRANSPORTATION 28 (1972). This estimate is a substantial under-
statement of air pollution costs. Only the effects of certain types of emissions in pro.
ducing certain categories of pollution damage were included in the analysis. Moreover,
even disregarding these limitations, the health damage costs, which represented nearly
ninety percent of total auto pollution damages, were grossly underestimated. The value
of human life and health includes not just (1) medical expenses and (2) lost earnings, but
also (3) pain and suffering while ill, (4) costs peculiar to death, such as legal fees and
funeral expenses incurred now instead of later, the deceased's lost capacity to enjoy per.
sonally selected assets more than his heirs, the deceased's employer's cost of training It
replacement, and a loss of volunteer community services (e.g., in charity drives), (5) the
psychic cost of grief and loss of companionship suffered by relatives and friends of the
deceased or incapacitated, and (6) the "intrinsic" value of living to the deceased, apart
from the fruits of economic productivity already counted as lost earnings.
54. The domestic auto industry has been severely criticized for developn g the engine
system with the most disadvantageous outlook with regard to initial price, fuel economy,
maintenance and durability-the modified traditional internal combustion engine. NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REI"T BY THE COMMIrTEE ON MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSIONS (1973).
55. In what can best be called a gratuitous aside, Mr. Winter says it reflects our col-
fusion over categories that occupational safety and health requirements are considered
"enabling regulation" and not "safety regulation." Winter, n.25. It should be apparent
that enabling regulation deals with the rules of the production process (which includes
working conditions), while safety regulation relates to the buyer-seller exchange.
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lation.5 1 He acknowledges that these "may be good laws and may argu-
ably be grounded in economic efficiency."5 7 Our error, he contends,
is to subsume them under the concept of "protect[ing] individuals in
the productive process,"s a rubric which, he says, might include tie
farm program and the Lockheed loan.59 Yet, unlike our original items,
neither of these latter two can be justified on grounds of economic effi-
ciency: Both are direct subsidies to preferred producers. The public
policies encompassed by "enabling regulation" seek to establish equal
rather than preferential treatment in the marketplace and to estab-
lish protections for anyone damaged (in certain defined ways) in the
production process-which is quite different from conferring benefits
on select groups. To leap to the conclusion that our category of en-
abling regulation is invalid, merely because some may erroneously in-
voke its rationale for protectionist purposes, is to deny the validity of
all categorizations.
Mr. Winter's criticism of yardstick competition is similar to his
criticism of enabling regulation: It might be abused. 0 The original
article never recommended that the government be allowed total dis-
cretion to call any action "yardstick enterprise." The result would
be a blank check for boondoggles and waste. What we did argue for
was a well-defined standard, which was that yardstick competition ful-
fill "a public need and, if properly circumscribed and wisely imple-
mented, set an example for private enterprise."'O Yardstick enterprises
would generally be required to be economically self-sufficient, without
public subsidies.612 Public control would be tight, benefits would be
progressively distributed, and a showing of the private sector's dis-
interest or incapacity to fulfill a "public need" would be a prerequisite
to the government's endeavor. The examples we offered met this
56. See Winter 899-900.
57. Winter 900. Mr. Winter balks, though, at justif)ing anti-discrinination laws on
economic efficiency grounds. He asks why we should regulate the "ps)chic" prefercnces
of discriminatory employers when we do not regulate the psychic preferences of con-
sumers; i.e., "why not have a law against taking the color of a product into account '
Winter 902 [emphasis added]. The underscored words signal the key distinction. We
allow consumers to consider "psychic," even irrational, criteria in selecting final products,
because such freedom presumably maximizes their utility. But here we are considering
irrational managerial choice of factor inputs (labor), an irrationality which we must cor-
rect to avoid inflating product prices due to labor inefficiency-not to mention the legal
and social norm against racial discrimination.
58. Id. at 900.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 900-01.
61. Nader 886.
62. Even in those rare cases where subsidies offset external economies uncapturable
by the yard stick firm or enable declining cost industries to price at marginal cost,
utilitarian principles would remain paramount.
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standard. The proposed SST subsidy, as concluded by Congress,
did not.
Finally, Mr. Winter articulates his opposition to the proposed Con-
sumer Protection Agency (CPA) which would advocate consumer inter.
ests before federal agencies. He observes that "government by its very
nature reacts to political pressure . . . [and] will respond most favor-
ably to those with the greatest ability and incentive to organize and
press their claims." 63 It is difficult, therefore, to understand why he
opposes enhancing consumers' ability to present their claims. Produc-
ers already have sizeable resources and well-developed organizations for
this purpose. Consumers have neither. By tradition if not by statute,
various departments of government represent special interests-e.g., the
Department of Agriculture, farmers; the Department of Labor, work-
ers; the Department of Commerce, businessmen. If these views are
amply expressed, why does Mr. Winter resist consumer representation?
The CPA's purpose would be to make the adversary system work, and
we would have expected support from those devoted to the legal
process.
Far from supporting it, Mr. Winter again deploys hypothetical hor-
ribles to justify his opposition. First, he contends, the agency would fail
to avoid the pitfalls of its predecessors.!4 He fails to see that the CPA,
unlike a Pentagon or ICC, would confer no direct benefits, nor reward
corporate acquisitiveness; it would only provide representation, be-
fore agencies and the courts. And unlike a CAB or FMC, with a
decidedly producer clientele, a CPA would cater to consumers and
hence develop a different orientation. Second, Mr. Winter argues that
because consumer tastes vary, "representation is impossible." 05 But con-
sumers do have many common identifiable interests-e.g., economic
efficiency, diversity of purchasing choices, avoidance of monopoly prof-
its or consumer fraud, and optimal purchasing information. But if Mr.
Winter is merely saying that such an agency should wisely balance com-
peting preferences and policy considerations, we would agree. Other
agencies try to do so. Their lack of unitary mission or constituency,
however, does not require that they cease to exist, which is where Mr.
Winter's logic takes him.
Mr. Winter completely misses two key points about a CPA. Its man-
date is not to decide, but to advocate. Other agencies would continue
to decide; the CPA would only participate in a resuscitated adversary
63. Winter 893.
64. Id. at 901.
65. Id. at 902.
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process. And its advocacy would seek not merely substantive changes
but procedural reforms, such as readily available agency reports, more
liberal confirmed standing requirements, in forma pauperis proceed-
ings, and the awarding of attorneys' fees for successful petitioners.
More able advocacy clearly benefits all consumers, whatever their tastes,
middle class or poor.
Exploiting still another guise, Mr. Winter poses as a poverty lawyer
representing "the most powerless in our society."G0 His line of reason-
ing, which has a certain surface appeal, is that safety measures must in-
crease product prices, which in turn must have a regressive impact on
the poor much as an excise tax does. It is the poor, however, who are
disproportionately the victims of externalities and who therefore
would receive the largest share of the net reduction in externality
costs that internalization, or its regulatory proxy, would produce. It
is the poor who are most damaged by air pollution, 7 accidents, 8 lead-
based paint poisoning, °9 and nutritional deficiencies.70 The poor are
also chiefly hurt by the market's failure to generate optimum product
information.71 Studies of consumer fraud, including those of David
Caplovitz,7 2 Philip Schrag73 and Jean Carper 4 describe in moving de-
tail how everyday bilks erode the living standards of poor citizens.
When you or I pay 60 for a $200 refrigerator, we are angry; when
the same happens to the poor, someone goes hungry. Indeed, so dis-
proportionate is their share of externalities that internalization would
generally represent a progressive redistribution of income in favor of
the poor.75 It is the height of hypocrisy for critics of consumer reform
to conscript the poor, who stand the most to gain, to defend their
standard status quo positions.7"
66. See id.
67. E.g., Craig & Berlin, The Air of Poverly, ENVIRONMENT, June, 1971, at 2.
68. Cf., e.g., Landes, An Economic Analysis of Accidents, 5m ANNuAL RErmoXT OF TIL
NAT'L BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RFSEARCH 95 (1970).
69. Oberle, Lead Poisoning: A Preventable Childhood Disease of the Slums, 165
ScIENcE 991 (1969).
70. See the nutrition surveys cited note 28 supra.
71. Cf., e.g., R. MICHAEL, THE EFFE T OF EDUCAION ON EFFiCiEsCY IN CoNssum'to.'
(Nat'1 Bureau of Economic Research, 1972). That some labeling devices seem to have
been utilized disproportionately by middle and upper income consumers may demonstrate
only that the labels were ineffectively constructed and displayed, as has almost univer-
sally been true of consumer labeling devices.
72. D. CAPLovrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963).
73. P. SCHRAG, COUNSEL FOR THE DECEIVED (1972).
74. J. CAP.RrR, NOT MrrH A GUN (1973).
75. In the case of externalities whose burden is not borne disproportionately by tie
poor and whose internalization would have a regressive impact (e.g., arguably water
pollution), internalization would still produce a net economic gain which could then be
redistributed to the poor through the tax and welfare system.
76. It is perhaps pardonable to be mistaken about the income redistribution conse-
quences of internalizing health, safety, and pollution costs and improving consumer
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IV
To answer one recurrent source of Mr. Winter's discontent: Yes,
we do have "personal preferences." 77 Our fundamental premise is the
maximization of consumer welfare. We oppose economic regulation
which supplants a workably competitive market; but we favor cost-
effective health and safety regulation which supplements a market
failing to protect consumers optimally. Despite Mr. Winter's persistent
contentions to the contrary, these positions are in no way inconsistent.
For all of his question raising, Mr. Winter seems unconcerned with
the possible real world results of his propositions. The issues here ulti-
mately move beyond mere economic and legal analysis, to the human
lives at stake. Would Mr. Winter object to Commerce Department
standards for flammable fabrics, and if so, what does one say to chil-
dren severely burned by their pajamas? Would he abolish the FDA?
If so, how should society then cope with a pregnant woman who suf-
fers from a drug's feticidal (fetus-killing) and teratogenic (fetus-de-
forming) effects, because the drug company failed to warn her of pos-
sible adverse reactions? Would he object to the newly created Product
Safety Commission? And if so, must we simply assume that an annual
30,000 deaths, 110,000 permanent disabilities and 20 million injuries
due to accidents associated with consumer products is the cost of pro-
gressive capitalism? 78 Mr. Winter provides no answers to such ques-
tions; his proposals and protestations amount to a defense of producer
sovereignty in a market which is mistakenly presumed to be self-
correcting.
Happily, many of Mr. Winter's contentions are, in both senses of
the word, academic. Notwithstanding Winter-like opponents of health
and safety regulation, the FDA will monitor dangerous drugs, auto
product information, all measures which would increase aggregate consumer welfare, and
especially the welfare of the poor. It is quite another matter, however, to accuse the
consumer movement of moving beyond the above objectives and advocating that tile law
"can compel the production of 'better'" and more costly products preferred by tile
upper-middle class, to the exclusion of "cheaper" in quality but less expensive items,
preferred by the poor. Winter 902. Mr. Winter, who makes this broadside criticism without
any evidence or example, accuses us of taking a position which we have never taken and
fundamentally reject.
Mr. Winter also states that safety, anti-pollution and consumer information measures"must decrease output and in particular decrease the production of cheap, mass pro.
duced goods" so important to the poor. Winter 902. No doubt, output, as measuredby
GNP, would be reduced, but social welfare, a measure which includes the countervailing
benefits of reduced pollution and accident damage and increased consumption efficiency,
would be advanced. Moreover, "the production of cheap mass produced goods" would
"in particular" be least affected, since their relatively high economies of scale could ab-
sorb the increase in unit costs imposed by regulations to a greater extent than "quality"
goods preferred by the middle and upper classes.
77. See, e.g., Winter 900-01.
78. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITrEE ON PRODUCT SAFErY 1 (1970).
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manufacturers will scramble to meet 1975 and 1976 pollution dead-
lines, the FTC will move against deceptive advertising, and the Prod-
uct Safety Commission will soon begin its work. And despite the hypo-
thetical haggling of anti-consumerists, the benefits of consumer legis-
lation are becoming widely recognized. "The most frequently men-
tioned effects of consumerism," a life insurance official recently com-
mented on a survey of small life insurance companies, "are better
service and improved policy owner relations . . and a trend toward
more frequent price benefit comparisons .... ."" If industry has begn
to see the light, can even Professor Winter be far behind?
79. Brain, The Life Insurance Outlook for 1973, BESe's R VVi, Jan. 1973, at 56.57.
